Abstract. Simplified AES was developed in 2003 as a teaching tool to help students understand AES. It was designed so that the two primary attacks on symmetric-key block ciphers of that time, differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis, are not trivial on simplified AES. Algebraic cryptanalysis is a technique that uses modern equation solvers to attack cryptographic algorithms. There have been some claims that AES is threatened by algebraic cryptanalysis. We will use algebraic cryptanalysis to attack simplified AES.
In his 1949 paper, "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems [8] ," Claude Shannon asked the question "How can we ever be sure that a [crypto]system which is not ideal ... will require a large amount of work to break with every method of analysis?" [ [8] , 704] Shannon suggested two approaches to that problem:
(1) We can study the possible methods of solution available to the cryptanalyst and attempt to describe them in sufficiently general terms to cover any of the methods he might use. We then construct our system to resist this "general" method of solution. (2) We may construct our cipher in such a way that breaking it is equivalent to (or requires at some point in the process) the solution of some problem known to be laborious. Thus, if we could show that solving a certain system requires at least as much work as solving a system of simultaneous equations in a large number of unknowns, of a complex type, then we would have a lower bound of sorts for the work characteristic. [ [8], 704] It is the second approach -in reverse -that is the basis of algebraic cryptanalysis. To do algebraic cryptanalysis, the cryptanalyst models the cryptosystem as a system of polynomial equations and then attempts to solve that system. The cryptanalyst's success is determined by whether or not it is possible to solve the resulting system. The technique of linear cryptanalysis, which has been known since the mid-1990s, attempts to find "approximately" linear relationships and solve the resulting system of linear equations, which is easy to do. Algebraic cryptanalysis determines exact (probably nonlinear) polynomial models of the cryptosystem, but then it depends on using powerful software and "tricks of the trade" to solve the systems. In 2006, Nicolas Courtois attracted attention to algebraic cryptanalysis by claiming to have a "fast algebraic attack against block ciphers" that would threaten the security of AES. An excellent introduction to algebraic cryptanalysis, some discussion of Courtois' claims, and an attack on the Courtois Toy Cipher may be found in [1] .
In November 2001 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) selected Rijndael, a cryptographic algorithm submitted by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen of Belgium, to be the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to replace the well-used but aged Data Encryption Standard (DES), which had served since 1977. AES is a 128-bit symmetric-key block cipher. AES is designed to be more efficient than 3DES, have a larger block size than 64-bit DES, and be resistant to two common attacks on block ciphers, differential and linear cryptanalysis, which have been known since the late 1980s (See [2] , [3] , and [4] .) and 1994 [6] , respectively. For a discussion of the AES algorithm see [9] .
In 2003, Musa, Schaefer, and Wedig published a simplified version of AES [7] for instructional purposes.
Though AES is not inordinately complicated, it would be best understood if one could work through an example by hand. However, this is not feasible. So we have designed a simplified version of AES for which it is possible to work through an example by hand. In addition, we believe that we have shrunk the parameters as much as possible without losing the essence of the algorithm. The parameters were chosen so that linear and differential cryptanalyses are not trivial. [ [7] , 149] Simplified AES is a two-round algorithm. (AES is a ten-round algorithm for 128-bit keys, a twelve-round algorithm for 192-bit keys, and a fourteen-round algorithm for 256-bit keys.) Musa, Schaefer, and Wedig do differential cryptanalysis of one-round and two-round simplified AES and linear cryptanalysis of one-round simplified AES. We will refer to simplified AES as S-AES.
In what follows, we will describe a simple algebraic cryptanalysis of S-AES.
Description of Simplified AES
The following description of S-AES is an abbreviation of the description of S-AES given in [7] .
S-AES uses a 16-bit key to encrypt 16-bit blocks. Because there are only 2
16
keys for S-AES, S-AES can be successfully attacked by brute force. A keyspace of size 2 80 is commonly thought to be necessary to protect against brute force attacks today.
1.1. The S-box. The substitution box, the S-box, is the heart of S-AES. Because solving systems of linear equations is easy, cryptosystems need to have non-linear components. The S-box is a nonlinear component of S-AES.
The S-box takes a 4-bit input and produces a 4-bit output. A block of four bits is often called a nibble (half of a byte).
The simplest way to describe the S-box of S-AES is as a lookup The S-Box can be described in another manner. Define 
, where the bits b 0 , ..., b 3 are considered as elements of GF (2). If p = 0, let q = p −1 where q is the inverse of p considered as an element 
Shift row (which acts on 16-bit blocks) SR:
Mix column (which acts on 16-bit blocks) MC: There are several ways to look at MC. (See [7] 1 .) For our purposes, probably the best way to view MC is in the following way:
Given two nibbles,
where ⊕ is XOR, and | is the symbol for concatenation.
The S-AES algorithm is:
where M is a 16-bit block of plaintext and C is a 16-bit block of ciphertext.
Algebraic Cryptanalysis of S-AES
Our algebraic cryptanalysis of S-AES is very simple to construct. First, we will construct polynomials over GF (2) that represent the cipher. Variables in our polynomials will be plaintext bits and ciphertext bits and unknowns will be keybits. Our attack is a known plaintext attack; so, next, we substitute known plaintextciphertext pairs into the polynomials that we have constructed. Finally, we will solve the system of polynomials for the key bits using the computer algebra software Magma [5] .
2.1. Generating the S-box polynomials. The first step in our algebraic attack on S-AES is to model the S-box as a system of polynomials. We have chosen a very straightforward procedure: we have constructed an ordered list of four polynomials each of which accepts 4-bit input and returns one bit of output. The four ordered bits of output are the four bits of the the S-box output.
To model the S-box, we used the lookup table representation of the S-box. For each of the output bits, we generated the corresponding polynomial in the following way. We first listed all possible monomials in terms of the input bits x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , and x 4 . To calculate the coefficients of the monomials, we substituted the known plaintext input/output pairs into the polynomials, and created a system of linear equations in terms of the coefficients of the polynomial. Solving this system gave us the coefficients, and thus the S-box polynomials. Here are the four S-box polynomials, where sbox i (x 1 , ..., x 4 ) is the i-th output bit of the S-box. ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 13 q 14 ⊕ q 13 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 16 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 16 , q 2 ⊕ q 10 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 14 ⊕ q 13 q 15 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 14 ⊕ q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 16 , q 3 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 14 ⊕ q 13 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 15 ,q 4 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 16 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 15 ⊕ q 16 ⊕ 1,q 5 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ 1, q 6 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 10 ⊕ q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ q 14 , q 7 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ q 15 , q 8 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ q 16 ⊕ 1) W [3]= (q 1 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 13 q 14 ⊕ q 13 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 16 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 16 , q 2 ⊕ q 10 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 14 ⊕ q 13 q 15 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 14 ⊕ q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 16 , q 3 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 14 ⊕ q 13 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 15 , q 4 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 16 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 15 ⊕ q 16 ⊕ 1, q 5 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ 1, q 6 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 10 ⊕ q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ q 14 , q 7 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ q 15 , q 8 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ q 16 ⊕ 1) 2.3. Generating the system of polynomials. The next step is to construct the system of equations that models the rest of S-AES encryption. We will be using as an example throughout this section the case we have a plaintext message of all 1's. We start with the ordered list of polynomials corresponding to K 0 . Then add K 0 to the ordered list (m 1 , ..., m 16 ) coordinate wise (where m 1 , . .., m 16 are the bits of the known plaintext); this results in an ordered list of 16 polynomials, f 1 , ..., f 16 . For example, if our plaintext message were the "all 1's" message, the polynomials would be:
The next step is to apply NS, which results from substituting the first four of the polynomials into the S-box polynomials to get 4 new polynomials, and repeating the process with the next four and the next four and the next four. This yields an ordered list of 16 more polynomials,
In our example, this results in the list of polynomials:
g 9 = q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ 1, g 10 = q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 10 ⊕ q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 12 , g 11 = q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 11 , g 12 = q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ 1, g 13 = q 13 q 14 ⊕ q 13 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 16 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 14 ⊕ q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 15 ⊕ 1, g 14 = q 13 q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 16 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 14 ⊕ 1, g 15 = q 13 q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 16 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 16 ⊕ 1, g 16 = q 13 q 14 q 15 ⊕ q 13 q 14 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 14 ⊕ q 13 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 13 q 15 ⊕ q 13 ⊕ q 14 q 15 q 16 ⊕ q 15 . The next step is to apply SR, which simply changes the order of some of the polynomials -transforming g 1 , ..., g 16 into g 1 , ..., g 4 , g 13 , ..., g 16 , g 9 , ..., g 12 , g 5 , ..., g 8 .
Then MC is applied; this can be modeled by a simple linear transformation on the vector of polynomials that gives us a new list of polynomials, (h 1 , ..., h 16 ).
In our example, this gives us the set of polynomials: 
q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 10 ⊕ q 12 , h 10 = q 5 q 6 q 7 ⊕ q 5 q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 5 q 7 ⊕ q 5 ⊕ q 6 q 7 ⊕ q 7 q 8 ⊕ 8 ⊕q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 10 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ 1, h 11 = q 5 q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 5 q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 5 q 7 ⊕ q 5 ⊕ q 6 q 7 ⊕ q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 7 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 10 , h 12 = q 5 q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 5 q 6 ⊕ q 5 q 7 ⊕ q 6 q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 6 q 7 ⊕ q 6 ⊕ q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 7 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ 1, h 13 = q 5 q 6 ⊕ q 5 q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 5 ⊕ q 6 q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 6 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 10 , h 14 = q 5 q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 5 q 6 ⊕ q 5 q 7 ⊕ q 6 q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 6 q 7 ⊕ q 6 ⊕ q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 7 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 10 ⊕ q 11 q 12 ⊕ 1, h 15 = q 5 q 6 q 7 ⊕ q 5 q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 5 q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 5 q 8 ⊕ q 5 ⊕ q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 6 ⊕ q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 7 ⊕ q 8 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 10 ⊕ q 9 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 11 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ 1, h 16 = q 5 q 6 q 7 ⊕ q 5 q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 5 q 6 ⊕ q 5 q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 5 q 7 ⊕ q 6 q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 6 q 7 ⊕ q 6 q 8 ⊕ q 6 ⊕ q 7 q 8 ⊕ q 8 ⊕ q 9 q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 9 q 11 ⊕ q 9 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 11 q 12 ⊕ q 10 q 12 ⊕ q 10 ⊕ q 11 ⊕ q 12 ⊕ 1.
We continue this process until all the components of S-AES encryption have been applied. (At this point we must abandon the example because the resulting polynomials become too large to display.) The result is an ordered list of 16 polynomials in terms of the key variables, (p 1 (q 1 , ..., q 16 ) , ..., p 16 (q 1 , ..., q 16 )). By its construction, it is easy to see that this system of polynomials models the S-AES encryption: For example, if one were to take the key 16 bit key 1111111111111111 and substitute it into the polynomials, one would get (p 1 (1, ..., 1) , ..., p 16 (1, ..., 1)), which is exactly the cipher text that results by applying S-AES to the plaintext (m 1 , ..., m 16 ) using the all 1's key. We do not know what the key is, but we do know the plaintext M = m 1 , ..., m 16 and the corresponding ciphertext, C = c 1 , .., c 16 . Therefore, we can set up a system of equations, namely (p 1 (q 1 , ..., q 16 ) , ..., p 16 (q 1 , ..., q 16 )) = (c 1 , ..., c 16 ),
Algebraic Cryptanalysis
Algebraic cryptanalysis is a potentially powerful attack on symmetric key block ciphers. Algebraic cryptanalysis begins by constructing a (probably quite large) system of (mostly nonlinear) polynomial equations in terms of key bits, plaintext bits, and ciphertext bits and then attempts to solve that system by using powerful equation solving software. The number of variables, the number of polynomials, and the degrees of the polynomials; the power of the equation solver; and the speed and amount of memory of the computer being used determines whether the system can be solved for the key bits. Whether AES is really threatened by algebraic cryptanalysis remains a question, but S-AES is quickly broken by the powerful F4 Gröbner Basis algorithm of Magma, even when naively used.
